The following description of the naval battle of Guadalcanal was posted on the Usenet newsgroup soc.history.war.world-war-ii by its author John J. J. Attwood (graham@connected.com). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL 13 November, 1942 Sources: R/Adm S. E. Morison, THE STRUGGLE FOR GUADALCANAL Eric Hammel, DECISION AT SEA C. W. Kilpatrick, NIGHT BATTLES IN THE SOLOMONS Richard B. Frank, GUADALCANAL Robert D. Ballard, THE LOST SHIPS OF GUADALCANAL The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal took three days to fight to a decision, 13 - 15 Nov 1942. It came about because an American reinforcement effort coincided with a major Japanese one. The narrow American victory here was to decide the Guadalcanal Campaign, the first American counteroffensive of the Pacific War -- and from here on out, they would be rolling the Japanese back towards their own home Islands. There was a great deal at stake, fighting for this jungle airfield that nobody really wanted. BACKGROUND: On 1 Nov the Japanese made a call-sign change which made American radio-intelligence go dark. But on 8 Nov the cryptanalysts managed to recover much of Yamamoto's operations order for the November "decisive battle" -- an extraordinary feat. When Halsey returned to his headquarters at Noumea on 9 Nov, his staff could hand him the outline of forthcoming Japanese operations: * The 8th Fleet preparing to escort a large troop convoy to land at Guadalcanal on Z-Day, 13 Nov -- this to consist of 11 transports and Destroyer Squadron TWO [12 destroyers] under R/Adm Tanaka; * 11th Fleet aircraft massing at Buin with orders to begin attacks against Guadalcanal on Z Minus 3; * A Japanese carrier group headed for a fuelling rendezvous just north of the equator to prepare for an air strike on Z minus 1; * The Combined Fleet preparing to sail from Truk with carriers ZUIHO and JUNYO, four battleships, five heavy, six light cruisers, and thirty-three destroyers. What they did NOT know at first was that two of the battleships, one light cruiser, and fourteen of the destroyers were meant to repeat Kurita's devastating battleship bombardment of October. On 10 Nov a Coastwatcher reported 61 masts at the Shortlands anchorage south of Bougainville -- including 6 cruisers, 33 destroyers -- and radio Intelligence could report to Halsey that Z-Day would be 13 Nov. Halsey immediately ordered his carrier force, TF 16 under R/Adm Thomas C. Kinkaid, to prepare to sail, which they did the next morning, 11 Nov. 11 - 13 NOVEMBER -- THE FORCES CONVERGE: Although able to "read the enemy's mail," Admiral Halsey had a lot to be worried about. To begin with the naval odds were considerably against him. After the Santa Cruz battle he had only one carrier under his command, ENTERPRISE, under frantic repair and with her forward elevator still out of commission. Until it was repaired 21 Nov she would be at a serious handicap for conducting flight operations. Her battered air group was perhaps equivalent to those of the smaller ZUIHO and JUNYO, if it came to a stand-up fight between them. Halsey could also call on 2 modern fast battleships, 4 heavy and 4 light cruisers, plus about 22 destroyers. Halsey had two separate groups of transports on the way to Guadalcanal at the same time, heavily escorted, carrying some 5,500 men. First to leave was R/Adm Norman Scott with AA cruiser ATLANTA and four destroyers, escorting three transports carying the 1st Marine Aviation Engineer Battalion, replacements for ground and aviation units, and stocks of ammunition and food. Following a day later was R/Admiral Kelly Turner escorting four transports carrying two battalions of the 182nd Infantry Regiment, artillery, the 4th Marine Replacement Battalion, Navy and Marine casuals, and even more supplies. TG 67.4, Turner's hefty escort, counted heavy cruisers SAN FRANCISCO and PORTLAND, light cruiser HELENA, AA cruiser JUNEAU, and ten destroyers; Turner had [for reasons not at all clear today] detatched heavy cruiser PENSACOLA and two further destroyers to reinforce TF 16: ENTERPRISE, battleships WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA, heavy cruiser NORTHAMPTON, AA cruiser SAN DIEGO, and six destroyers. The Americans had 14 modern and 6 old submarines patrolling the Solomons; the Japanese about 14 I-boats. The WWI destroyer - minecraft SOUTHARD sank one of the latter, while cruising ahead with sister HOVEY to make sure that the Japanese had not laid mines in the Lunga Anchorage. On 11 Nov Scott arrived and his transports, ZEILIN, LIBRA and BETELGEUSE, began unloading. They were chased from their anchorages twice, once by an attack by 9 VAL dive bomberrs on them -- which slightly damaged the ZEILIN and led to all 9 of the VALs being shot down -- and once by an attack on Henderson Field. At night the ZEILIN withdrew with the destroyer LARDNER, the transports went to join Turner, and Scott patrolled Ironbottom Sound with ATLANTA and the remaining destroyers -- but the Tokyo Express did not run that night. Dawn the next day, 12 November, showed six US transports and their heavy escort off Lunga Point. A shore battery lobbed occasional salvos at the transports, and light cruiser HELENA and, later, destroyers, replied. The Japanese naval observer ashore, L/Cdr Mitzi, reported three battleships, three cruisers, eleven destroyers and five transports off Lunga. His report prompted Yamamoto's chief of Staff, Ugaki, to recommend ordering the cruisers of 8th Fleet and the detatched DesDiv 27 to join Admiral Abe's bombardment group -- built around battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA -- but the rest of the staff confluded that the Americans as usual would be gone with the sun. The only action taken was to order Abe to have Destroyer Squadron FOUR [5 destroyers] run in ahead of him to sweep for any lingering Americans. If V/Adm Mikawa saw fit to join forces with Abe that was up to him -- he was not so inspired, as it turned out. The 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul also received Mitzi's report, and a strike of 16 BETTY bombers and 20 ZERO fighters was sent off against Turner's force. Amply warned by coastwatchers and then radar, Turner got his ships under way and maneuvered to repel air attack, with 20 WILDCAT and 8 P39 fighters on CAP overhead. The Japanese were sighted at 1405 over Florida Island, dividing into two groups, and Turner was a past master at this sort of thing -- he presented his broadside to the group to the northeast and tempted them to attack first rather than wait for the southeasterly group to get into position. When they were committed to the attack, he turned his narrow sterns to them, making all their torpedoes miss. The southeasterly group, hit hard by the defending fighters and thoroughly shot up by ships' AA, attacked too late to combine with the other group. Such torpedoes as the survivors did get away Turner's ships avoided by independent maneuvering. No torpedo hits were made, and 11 of the 16 BETTYs were shot down, the other 5 shot up. One of the lost bombers, set on fire by the transport McCAWLEY, crashed into the after superstructure of heavy cruiser SAN FRANCISCO, flagship of R/Adm Daniel J. Callaghan, Turner's surface escort commander. An officer and 23 men were killed; the executive officer and 44 others were wounded, mostly badly burned. Battle-2 and the after gun directors were badly damaged by the crash. SAN FRANCISCO transferred 28 men to the transports for evacuation; the XO, Commander Mark Crouter, insisted on staying on board, and was put in his bunk, heavily sedated -- a decision that was shortly to cost him his life. [His is but one name involved in the holocaust to come to be memorialized by a new destroyer or destroyer escort over the next few months.] The transports headed back to the Lunga anchorage to resume unloading until sundown would force them to withdraw. The Americans now had search plane reports to confirm the Japanese timing and objective. Admiral Abe's battleship bombardment force had been seen, coming down fromt he north at 25 knots; so had R/Adm Takama's Destroyer Squadron FOUR, heading for a rendezvous with him. Another plane sighted Tanaka's transport convoy just as they cleared the Shortlands. The man on the spot was R/Adm Richmond Kelly Turner in Savo Sound, who made two decisions on how to meet the oncoming Japanese -- one of them bold and inspired, the other one conventional and unfortunate. The bold and inspired thing that Turner did was to strip his transports beyond the bounds of prudence of warships. The Japanese had two or more battleships, two to four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 10 - 12 destroyers; in Turner's estimation they were either intending to bombard Henderson Field or attack his transports as they withdrew through Indispensable Strait. TF 16 had sailed too late to help -- Turner must face the onslaught alone. Turner bet that the Japanese were after Henderson Field -- this with no hint of Abe's planned bombardment from radio intelligence -- and he did not hedge that bet at all. He kept only the destroyer BUCHANAN, damaged by friendly fire in the afternoon's air-sea battle, SHAW and McCALLA [low on fuel], and the elderly HOVEY and SOUTHARD. All five cruisers and the other eight available destroyers he peeled off to intercept any Japanese bombardment effort against Henderson Field, and here is where his brilliance stumbled, for by simple seniority he placed in command R/Adm Daniel J. Callaghan in the SAN FRANCISCO, rather than R/Adm Norman Scott, in the ATLANTA [or, better yet, the SG-equipped HELENA or JUNEAU]. Callaghan had been Chief of Staff to Halsey's predecessor Robert Ghormley and had only gone back to sea two weeks before, with no battle experience at all. Scott had been at sea for six months and had a notable victory to his credit, the Battle of Cape Esperance 12 Oct. In the time since he had learned much more about the new SG search radars than he had known before his battle, and was arguably a much more fit Commander, especially had he been able to transfer to one of the SG-equipped ships, notably the cruiser HELENA. But Turner reflexively ordered Callaghan to be Officer in Tactical Command, because Callaghan's appointment to Flag Rank was exactly fifteen days before Scott's. It is this decision more than any other that led to the fierce blood-letting and side-scraping brawl to follow, rather than a better managed, more carefully fought meeting engagement using the advantage of the SG radar with its Plan Position Indicator, which displays like a map instead of a hyperthyroid oscilloscope. What Callaghan seems to have intended was to cruise the Guadalcanal coast closely, and when the Japanese were detected,to turn athwart their course and "cross the T", so that only the lead guns of the lead ships could effectively reply to all of his, firing broadside. To minimize identification, command, and control problems, the thirteen ships would steam in a single column, arranged in three divisions: four destroyers, five cruisers, four destroyers. In anticipation of a possible course reversal during the approach or during the battle, he had placed his senior destroyer officer, Captain Robert G. Tobin ComDesRon TWELVE, in the REAR division of destroyers, which were the AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN and FLETCHER. Of these, only the latter had the new SG surface-search radar that could reliably make out targets and plot them at 25,000 - 30,000 yards, as the cruisers HELENA and BOISE had done at the Battle of Cape Esperance. Heading the lead division of destroyers was his other divisional commander, Cdr Murray Stokes ComDesDiv TEN; these were the CUSHING, LAFFEY, STERETT and FLETCHER, the latter again a brand new ship with SG radar. Callaghan may not have known it, but in L/Cdr Edwin E. "Butch" Parker of CUSHING, the leading one of his thirteen ships, he probably had his most single battle-aware and experienced destroyer captain, as Parker had fought in the Asiatic Fleet in the desperate months after Pearl Harbor. Of the five cruisers, it has been argued that two should not have been there at all -- the ATLANTA and JUNEAU were AA cruisers with 16 5-in. guns, and only AA ammunition for them. They would have been better employed being sent to TF 16 instead of PENSACOLA. The JUNEAU at least had SG radar, but she was the last in the column of five. Of the three larger cruisers SAN FRANCISCO was the least well-equipped to be a flagship and had been damaged that afternoon by a bomber crash in her aft control; the older PORTLAND apparently, and the large light cruiser HELENA definitely, were equipped with the SG radar. It has been suggested that Callaghan's choice of SAN FRANCISCO was because he had been her captain in 1941 and she was named after his home town; but it may also have been because Scott had her as flagship at Cape Esperance, and relieving him meant moving into the flagship he had just vacated. To make matters worse SAN FRANCISCO's veteran captain, Charles MacMorris, had been promoted to Rear Admiral; his replacement, Cassin Young, had only taken command four days before! The ironic result, whatever the reasons, is that TG 67.4 had the less experienced and capable of the two admirals available in the least suitable flagship available. At 2200 TG 67.4 turned back from seeing off their transports, and at midnight entered Lengo Channel on course 280< T., speed 18 knots; a change of speed to 15 knots was ordered. The sea was smooth, sky partly cloudy and quite clear overhead. There was no moon; lightning flashes could be seen to the northwest over Florida Island and to the southwest over Guadalcanal. Taivu Point was reported bearing 240< T., distant 2 miles. Following the Guadalcanal coast, Callaghan ordered a change of course from 280 to 290< T at 0103, and signalled by TBS at 0114 to all ships: "Keep well closed up. Report any contacts immediately. Do not answer." Four minutes later they passed Lunga Point to port. Where were the Japanese? Were they coming at all? The Japanese were coming, all right -- but they had been beset by difficulties having nothing to do with the Americans. Yamamoto had intended to have a Sweeping Unit precede Abe, six to nine miles ahead of him. If US warships were present they would attack with torpedoes and report to Admiral Abe. Abe would then the choice of preserving the battleships from damage by withdrawing, or of closing to fight on terms favourable to his ships. Given the Japanese caution with their heavy ships, I am inclined to believe Abe would have withdrawn without fighting Callaghan, or perhaps fought a brief and cautious action at an indecisively long range. Given the disposition of the Americans in a long single column, and their parlous command and control arrangements, however, the outcomes of other cruiser - vs. - destroyer combats like Tassafaronga, Kula Gulf and Kolombangara lead me to suspect that a torpedo attack by Admiral Takama's destroyers would have inflicted cruel losses on Callaghan, mostly among the van destroyers and the cruisers. The intentions of both sides were overtaken by events -- and the result was an unplanned zero-range melee. Abe's force became complete when Takama's five ships of DesRon FOUR rendezvoused and took up station over four miles ahead -- YUDACHI and HARUSAME in a column on the port bow, ASAGUMO [flag], MURASAME and SAMIDARE in column on the starboard bow. The light cruiser NAGARA was stationed 3,000 yards ahead of battleship HIEI, and battleship KIRISHIMA 2000 yards astern. R/Adm Masatomi Kumura in NAGARA, commander Destroyer Squadron TEN, was responsible for navigating the Bombardment Unit to the target area. He had three of his destroyers to port -- veteran YUKIKAZE and AMATSUKAZE, with the new large AA destroyer TERUTSUKI -- and three more to starboard, AKATSUKI, INADZUMA and IKAZUCHI. At about 1700 the Bombardment Unit ran into rain squalls and visibility fell, though the navigators were able to spot Nudai and Malaita Islands during the occasional gaps, and soon after the force came into the north end of Indispensable Strait. The rain got worse as it got dark, and the wakes of the escorting destroyers could barely been seen 1 - 2 miles from HIEI. At 1900 hours Abe announced his plan for the bombardment, scheduled for 0150 - 0230, including the sweep by Takama's ships well ahead of the main body, as Yamamoto had ordered. Poor weather was now threatening Abe's mission, wheatever the Americans might have in mind. At 2145 the R Area Air Force informed the Admiral that weather over Guadalcanal was so bad that aircraft spotting was "next to impossible." The weather in his area also was poor, and the Admiral decided to reverse course and slow to 12 knots, bide his time, and hope the weather would improve. At 0005/13th Abe's main body came about to port to a northeasterly heading, but Destroyer Squadron FOUR apparently reversed to a northerly one, and so drew farther and farther out of station. Within half an hour, Guadalcanal had signaled him that the weather there had improved, and Abe decided a bombardment might be possible after all. At 0038 or so Abe's ships took up course 225 deg. T. At 0046 the Admiral ordered Takama to take Destroyer Squadron FOUR ahead on their planned sweep off Lunga Point, and Takama did turn onto course 180 deg. two minutes later and speed up to 18 knots at 0056 ... but DesRon FOUR was not four miles ahead of Abe at all, but somewhere on his starboard quarter! Two course changes masked by rain and cloud had completely deranged the formation. At 0059 Abe brought the main body to course 180 degrees T., due south, speed still 12 knots. At 0100 Admiral Takama, at least, began to realize that he was out of station when he asked YUDACHI for her position, and at 0106 YUDACHI reported the astonishing news that she could see NAGARA broadside to port -- when she should be fine off his starboard quarter! I assume Takama could see wakes to his port and wondered if it was YUDACHI. Not long after this Takama led around to port and took ASAGUMO, MURASAME and SAMIDARE across the wakes of the main body -- which was the wrong way: his proper course, had he but known it, was to stay on the course he was on, but increase his speed. I am mystified as to why -- my best guess is that he thought he was seeing YUDACHI and HARUSAME and that both of them were off the formation's starboard bow, not off the quarter. Admiral Abe thought Takama's ships were six miles ahead of him, moving out to nine miles as planned. At 0125 HIEI identified the signal lights on Cape Esperance, and brought his ships to course 140 deg. T., increasing speed to 18 knots. HIEI's floatplane had reported ten ships off Lunga at Sunset, and L/Cdr Mitzi had reported landing operations still taking place at 1900 -- but after that, visibility deteriorated and he could not be sure. Abe reluctantly concluded he might have to face American warships. DesDiv 27 -- Captain Satoyama's SHIGURE, YUGURE and SHIRATSUYU -- had been sent to patrol between Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands against interference by US PT boats, and their report of arriving on station at 0130 without running into US forces was encouraging. This, and the silence from DesRon FOUR, led Abe to believe he had Savo Sound all to himself, and he now ordered "Gun battle. Target, airfield." HIEI and KIRISHIMA loaded the special Type 3 bombardment ammunition; by this time they were steering 105 deg. at 23 knots. At 0142 Abe was thunderstruck to receive a message from the destroyer YUDACHI "Enemy sighted" bearing "toward Lunga." He had only time to yell at his Flag Signal Officer, "What is the range and bearing? And where is YUDACHI?" Within the minute HIEI's own lookouts were warning, "Four black objects ahead! Looks like warships. Five degrees to starboard, eight thousand metres. Unsure yet; visibility bad." And Abe flashed to the Bombardment Unit, "Probable enemy ships in sight, bearing 136 degrees." He ordered a formation turn left to a course of 080 degrees, which would be executed at 0145. The Admiral also ordered his ships to prepare for surface action -- when they had ready racks and hoists loaded with the Type 3 special bombardment ammunition. This has given rise to the "HE shells piled all over the decks..." of the battleships" story, which seems to have originated with Hara in JAPANESE DESTROYER CAPTAIN, and which Frank dismisses as apocryphal in a footnote in GUADALCANAL -- correctly, I believe. The quickest way to get shells out of the ammunition hoists was to fire them, and that is what I believe they did. As his ships began to turn, the Admiral had no idea that the Americans had been watching him for the past twenty minutes, and had been maneuvering to steam across his track for eight. Had Takama's destroyers been where they were supposed to be, the Americans would have been maneuvering to cross the "T" on *them*, which would have masked Abe's formation coming up behind. Takama would have reported, confused, delayed and punsished Callaghan, and bought time for Admiral Abe to maneuver to advantage against him. Admiral Callaghan was not getting what he intended, either. The large light cruiser HELENA [Captain Gilbert C. Hoover] had made the first radar contact at 0124, and reported contacts bearing 312 and 310, distant 27,000 and 32,000 yards. Three minutes later she added, "Enemy ships bearing 310< T., range 31,900 yards." At the same time, 0127, CTG 67.4 ordered course changed to 310< T. -- which put him onto a parallel but opposite course to Abe, who it will be remembered had just sighted Cape Esperance and come left to head for Lunga Point and Henderson Field. At 0130 HELENA signaled all ships that the enemy disposition was 14,500 yards off the port bow, making 23 knots on course 105<. The two formations were those closing each other at a combined speed of about 40 knots, some 1300 yards a minute. CTG 67.4 told all ships at 0132: "Guadalcanal reports an unidentified aircraft 000< T., 26 miles." An unknown ship [HELENA?] reported, "Target at 312< T., range 26,000." CTG 67.4 to van destroyers: "Any of you boys pick her up?" Reply from unknown ship: "Negative." At 0134 HELENA's radar plot reported the enemy course was 134< T., speed 20 knots. A minute later CTG 67.4 broadcast to all ships: "Column right to 310< T., and van unit directly towards enemy." Cdr Stokes, ComDesDiv 10 in CUSHING, advised CTG 67.4 by TBS radio: "Three unidentified ships 45< on our port bow. Be alert." In fact YUDACHI and HARUSAME would have been in that direction, but a good 5000 yards off. Had CUSHING somehow seen them? Hammel, having interviewed L/Cdr Parker of CUSHING, makes no mention of such an early sighting. It sounds to me like Parker had correctly plotted HELENA's reports and was warning the van destroyers, the Admiral, or both to keep their eyes skinned. HELENA reported to CTG 67.4: "We have four [enemy targets] in a line." At 0137 as TG 67.4 was changing course to north, CTG 67.4 ordered, "Change speed to 20 knots." According to Hammel, at 0140 the O'BANNON had three contacts on her radar and reports them at about this time: one 11000 yards at 287<, one at 8000 yards at 312<, and one at 6000 yards at 42<. I cannot make this clue fit with the ships of either side at 0140, although it DOES appear pretty accurate at 0145, with the 42< contact being HARUSAME and YUDACHI running off to the east after their 0142 sighting of CUSHING. Another possibility: the bearings may be relative, and the O'BANNON may not really be steering north. CTG 62.4 to O'BANNON: "What is range?" At 0141 HELENA replied to the Admiral: "Range is 2,300 yards." CUSHING suddenly sighted what looked like three Japanese destroyers [in fact two, YUDACHI and HARUSAME] 2,000 - 3,000 yards off the port bow, crossing from left to right, and L/Cdr Parker brought her left at 0142 to 315< T. to unmask aft guns and torpedo batteries. The Division Commander reported the visual sighting immediately, but not the fact that CUSHING had hauled off the course set by the Admiral -- and stayed on it. Not knowing this, Callighan was just signalling his ships, "Column right to 000< T." Only half, perhaps, of the column had made the turn north ordered at 0135. PORTLAND was just coming up to the turn point and logged, but does not seem to have reported by TBS, four ships in a line southwest to northeast, east of Savo. HELENA reported, "Look like they're dead ahead on the port bow." CTG 67.4 tried to get through to DesDiv 10, "What do you make of it now? Are you there?" It was HELENA who replied, "We have a total of about ten targets. Own course 000< T., speed 18 knots." Her radar officer could apparently make out 14 ships now, course 120< T., speed 20 - 23 knots, but it is doubtful that this ever got through the babble on TBS to R/Adm Callaghan. ComDesDiv 10, Cdr Murray Stokes in CUSHING, bulled through the crowded TBS circuit to ask Admiral Callaghan at 0143: "Shall I let them have a couple of fish?" LAFFEY and STERETT had just made the turn to port to follow CUSHING. CTG 67.4 asked Stokes: "What is their course?" Stokes replied, "There is a ship crossing bow from port to starboard, range 4000 yards MAX." In fact they were considerably closer, and moving off to the east at a speed of 25 - 30 knots. O'BANNON now turned 45< left at 0144 to follow STERETT; it seems that the destroyers were jostled by the surprise of the turn and that O'BANNON had to turn more than 45 degrees and wound up on STERETT's port quarter instead of astern. Admiral Callaghan came onto TBS at 0145 to give all ships the electrifying word, "Stand by to open fire." Callaghan was trying to 'Cross the T' -- but he was distracted after giving this prep order by a jumble up ahead, triggered by CUSHING's turn at 0142 to bring guns and torpedo tubes to bear on YUDACHI and HARUSAME. The destroyers had got around somehow, complicating life for Admiral Scott's flagship, the cruiser ATLANTA -- who had to turn hard left to avoid over-running O'BANNON, possibly so far that her bows are pointing west. Seeing her unexpectedly swing out of line ahead of him, CTG 67.4 dropped what he was doing to ask Captain Jenkins: "What are you doing?" Jenkins answered matter-of-factly, "Avoiding our own destroyers." Admiral Callaghan answered him, "Come back to your course as soon as you can. You are throwing the whole column into disorder." Several ships had to maneuver radically to avoid collision and keep station; for example HELENA had gone to flank speed, stopped all engines, and gone to flank speed again, all within about ninety seconds at just about this time. By this time most of Callighan's ships had radar contacts, though not all had reported them. As I mentioned earlier, O'BANNON's radar report of 0140 fits the clues better for 0145. At this time, however, she reported sighting a column of 5 ships 4000 yards off her port beam on parallel but opposite course, approaching slowly. AARON WARD, Captain Tobin's flagship leading the rear division of destroyers, had a large radar contact 12000 yards out at 315< relative; from this I deduce that AARON WARD was on a northerly course, and that her target was one of the two battleships to show up distinctly on an SC or FD radar at this kind of range. She was 5,300 yards behind CUSHING in the column. CTG 67.4 admonished all ships at 0146: "All hands hold your course." SAN FRANCISCO must have turned to port to follow the ATLANTA northwestwards at about this time. JUNEAU -- one of the 2 - 3 cruisers fitted with SG radar -- reported to CTG 67.4, "We have several ships on starboard." Either Captain Swenson mis-spoke himself, or JUNEAU was reporting HARUSAME and YUDACHI, who after removing themselves from the vicinity of CUSHING would have traveled a good three thousand yards east from where they were sighted, more if they went faster than 25 knots. ATLANTA began turning right at about 0147, in obedience to the Admiral's order. At about this time she had a target on her SC radar 3,000 yards "ahead", which was most likely NAGARA, who had crossed the American's T and gone on into their starboard bow arcs. ATLANTA was probably swinging past north, in the middle of a series of turns to starboard; she had a destroyer 2000 yards off the port bow and another one 1600 yards to port. SAN FRANCISCO was now turning to port to follow her, but when ATLANTA cut around even harder right, SAN FRANCISCO steadied on course north. 0150 -- THE BATTLE BEGINS: Time had run out. Callaghan's maneuvering had not brought about the 'crossing the T' he sought, but a headlong collision, and his formation was just about to interpenetrate Abe's. With strange ships about to steam right into their own formation, the veteran Japanese captains took action. First the destroyer AKATSUKI to port of the American column, then within the minute the battleship HIEI almost dead ahead, switched on searchlights. The first gunfire flashed out and torpedoes splashed the water within seconds. Eric Hammel posits the time this happened as being 0150; HELENA believed it to be 0148, and other ships varied a minute or two either way. The Japanese were not alone in being ready to pounce when the word was given. Silence was no longer golden, and at least two of the van destroyers and two of the cruisers opened fire as soon as the searchlight flashed on. Lead destroyer CUSHING opened fire on YUKIKAZE or perhaps AMATSUKAZE 2,200 yards off her starboard bow: no hits. LAFFEY and STERETT behind her did not fire right off the bat but O'BANNON did, range unknown -- probably at AKATSUKI to port. In the ATLANTA, starkly bathed in searchlight glare, the order rapped out, "Commence firing! Counter-illuminate!" ATLANTA's searchlights snapped on, and her forward gun group erupted in continuous firing at a destroyer to the right of, and somewhat behind, AKATSUKI, at a range given as 1900 yards -- most likely INADZUMA but possibly IKAZUCHI. ATLANTA's port waist and after gun mounts whipped around and sent a stream of tracer from continuous firing right back down the searchlight beam at AKATSUKI just 1600 yards away. Cruiser HELENA opened fire with the first of 175 6", 20 5" shells on AKATSUKI, range 4,200 yards. HELENA also opened fire at a destroyer at 6200 yards somewhat "left" of AKATSUKI, with about 20 rounds from the secondary batteries, and thought she made hits; this should be IKAZUCHI. This was long range for effective shooting, but SOMEBODY hit IKAZUCHI in these two minutes, knocking out her forward gun mount. [Smart money is on ATLANTA during her all-too-brief time in action, I'd say -- she could scarcely have missed.] Destroyer FLETCHER may also have fired early, range 5,500 yards, at AKATSUKI; as the target is described as using a searchlight from off the port bow, this tells us that FLETCHER must have turned onto the northbound leg of the task group's track by this time. AKATSUKI sighted ATLANTA, and everybody but Dr. Robert Ballard and I think that she succeeded in getting away torpedoes at her. [AKATSUKI's Torpedo Officer LT Shinya survived, and Dr. Ballard quotes him as saying AKATSUKI got away neither shell nor torpedo at all, before being smashed into a blazing wreck, soon to sink; ATLANTA's first shells struck the vicinity of the destroyer's bridge less than 20 seconds after she illuminated ATLANTA.] AKATSUKI may have opened fire on HELENA, who was hit early by 2 - 3 5-in. shells with one man killed. AKATSUKI was hit immediately, and in the next two minutes would be thoroughly smashed by the gunfire of at least three ships. She blazed up and her searchlight dimmed and went out. When the searchlights came on and ships ahead opened fire, PORTLAND was about to turn left from her northerly course to follow ships ahead onto 330